Ernest Mikhailovich Ametistov
"October Reminiscences"
(a shortened version of a tape recording)
I, Ernest Ametistov, have made this recording. I will, probably, use it for writing my memoirs if I ever get to doing that or it might be of use to those who will be studying the history of these events. I will only talk about what I personally have witnessed or have taken part in. And also about my personal understanding of the reasons, course and consequences of these events.
Today is October 3, 1994 - the first anniversary of that terrible day, October 3, 1993, which could have become the last day of my own life and the first day of very frightful events for Russia leading, in the end, to its ruin.
How did all this begin? I should probably start with December 1992 or even earlier, with August 1991. I will have to think about this. But now I will deal with the events that directly preceded the October tragedy.
By September 21, 1991 the political atmosphere was becoming more and more electrified. The most various rumors were circulated. However, the most frequently repeated one was the rumor about President Yeltsin's fatal decision about which he warned everyone at the end of the summer. This must have been an intended leakage, because by the end of that working day at the Constitutional Court I had heard several people talk about Boris Yeltsin's intention to make a speech that very day. I also got phone calls regarding the same question. Around 6 p.m., when I was ready to go home, I received a phone call from Sergei Alexandrovich Filatov Filatov (at the time the Head of the President's Administration - ed.). He asked me to come to Staraya Square (the President's Administration was located on this square - ed.) to the office of Vladimir Shumeiko (Deputy Head of the President's Administration - ed.) where he, Filatov, would meet me. On my way I stopped at the office of Tamara Morshchakova (Deputy Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation - ed.) whom I wanted to inform about this conversation. But then I decided not to because I really had no idea what we would be discussing. When I entered Shumeiko's office he greeted me and I could see that he was in a very good mood. Several minutes later Sergei Filatov joined us and said: "Ernest Mikhailovich, today the President will announce his decree on the dissolution of Parliament, on the termination of its activity and on the phased constitutional reform. I will not speak about all the details of the President's speech and decree but I want to tell you about only one clause of this decree: the Presidents wants to suspend the activity of the Constitutional Court and terminate its activity. What do you think about this?" I thought for several moments and replied: " You know, I think that this should be done differently. I perfectly well understand the reason why the President wants to do this and, most likely, he is right considering the role my colleagues have played in the development of the current events. But I think that to deal like this with the Constitutional Court would be unwise and would show a lack of foresight. We should find a more mild way of doing this". Shumeiko supported my point of view. We spoke for several minutes and decided to propose the following to the President: the President suggests that the Constitutional Court suspends its hearings. This way it will not be a direct ban. Filatov immediately called the President and from their discussion of this issue I understood that Boris Yeltsin agreed with the proposed wording which was later included in his degree. In his recollections Boris Nikolayevich provides a different interpretation of this issue: he does not mention that the decision was made an hour before his speech and does not mention neither me or Filatov in this connection. He wrote that it was finally decided not to abolish the Constitutional Court. This, of course, does not really matter.
After it was decided that this change will be made, we continued to discuss the forthcoming events. Filatov was agitated and I could see that he had gone through many difficult days before this decision was made. About an hour or an hour-and-a-half before 8:00 p.m. (that is when the President made his speech) four people literally ran into Shumeiko's office. These were Sergei Kovalyov, Sergei Stepashin, Nikolai Ryabov and Pochinok (имена!) (deputies of the Supreme Soviet of Russia). They were overly excited and had arrived straight from a session of the Presidium of Supreme Soviet. Interrupting each other they insisted that something had to be done to stop the President from speaking, because "at the Presidium Ruslan Khasbulatov (Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Russia who was arrested for organizing a coup and later amnestied) has completely discredited himself and has actually set the Presidium's majority against himself". We continued our discussion devoted to whether the President should do what was expected of him or not. Our four visitors held that if the President reversed his decision, Khasbulatov would find himself in the most awkward position, the opinions of his opponents in the Presidium would prove correct and this would mean complete disgrace which, in turn, would allow to get rid of him in quite a peaceful way. I must say that these four men were on the verge of panic. I remember Stepashin saying: "We will be hung by our feet! What are they doing?! We will be hung by our feet!". However Shumeiko was the only one who did not lose composure and was sitting at his desk and smiling. I liked him them very much, he gave the impression of a tough guy, a real man. In the midst of a very critical situation he did not show even a trace of fear or panic, although I do not know what was going on deep inside of him. He just sat there smiling.
Nevertheless, we decided to get in touch with the President once again and and try to talk him out of making that speech. We dialed his number but his assistant told us that the President could not speak to us because he had gone to his dacha residence outside of the city. Then we decided to immediately go to the Kremlin and there, in the President's reception office, with the help of his assistants find the president or try to speak to him over the phone. I was asked to join the negotiations with the President. I can't say that I was very much willing to do so. But these were people, especially Filatov and Kovalyov, whom I knew very well and greatly respected and continue to respect. I agreed and we went to the Kremlin, actually we rushed to the Kremlin to be more precise, because we had only less than an hour left till the President's speech.
When we arrived at the President's reception office we were met by one of his assistants who tried to connected us with the President by phone. But all was in vain. The assistant had given our names and said that we wished to speak with the President over the phone, but this had no effect and we were refused. I do not remember exactly the reason, but I don't even think a reason was mentioned. And right there, in the President's reception office, we heard his speech. I must admit that it was a very impressive speech. He spoke with courage and was very convincing. But when the speech was over we parted: I went home and the other four returned to the Supreme Soviet.
When I arrived, my wife Olga was home and we decided to go for a walk and discuss the recent and forthcoming events. We decided to go out mostly because of our fear of being listened to in our own house. We strolled along Presnya Street thinking and talking and I remember that in general we had predicted everything that was supposed to happen. And this meant that most likely this would not end peaceful peacefully and that the Constitutional Court at its session, just as it did on March 20, would pass the same kind of verdict not in favor of the President. Later this decision would be used as grounds for impeachment and, consequently, Vice President Rutskoi would announce himself President which would, in turn, mean what we feared most - a split in the higher echelons of power (because of the existence of two presidents) and in the army (because of two commanders-in-chief). And we very much doubted that such a situation would end peacefully.
While walking around our house I decided to call Sergei Filatov once again because, honestly speaking, I felt for him knowing how he was upset by all that was happening. I called him at his dacha around 11:00 p.m. His wife Galina answered and I could hear she was crying. She called him to the phone and I asked: "How are you taking all this, Sergei?" He answered that he was doing his best. I said: "We must hold out and stay together. The decision has been made and there's no way back." He asked about the session of the Constitutional Court which was supposed to take place - he heard about it over the radio. I was unaware of this since we were not home at the moment of this announcement, although I assumed that today Zorkin would what to call such a session. After I learned about this session Olga and I spent some time deciding whether I should go to it or not and we finally decided that I should, because otherwise it could have been interpreted as cowardice on my part. And I went to the Constitutional Court.
When I arrived almost everyone had already gathered in the Small Hall of the CC. Chairman Zorkin (Chairman of the CC from 1991 through 1993) was, as usually, inwardly intense and constrained -- this was an important part of his image on which he must've worked hard. He was brief. He announced that the event that everyone expected had taken place and that, in accordance with Article 74 of the Law, i.e. on our own initiative, we were supposed to consider the issue of the unconstitutional actions of the President. Unlike on March 20, we did not even have a document to consider, instead each justice was provided with the texts of the President's appeal and decree. Zorkin was ready to open the session immediately, but justices Vitruk, Morshchakova, I and some others requested at least some time to be able to read the texts and try to understand what had, actually, been said and done. Unwillingly Zorkin gave us a 30-minute break to study the texts.
We gathered again in half-an-hour and the discussion began. All that was said then is reflected in the minutes of that session and has been publicized and that is why I will not relate this once again. I was not that active at this session as at the one of March 20th. This time I had the feeling that it was pointless to waste all those dear and rarely pronounced words before this gathering, to put it mildly. I knew that their decision was predetermined and it was impossible to change their opinion. The only thing I did then, as at the session of the 20th of March, was to draw the attention of everyone to the fact that this was a violation of the procedure and that there should have been, as a minimum, a meeting with the President. But my proposal was instantly rejected. Tamara Morshchakova spoke a lot and very convincingly, as did Justice Kononov. I agreed with what they had said and expressed my opinion in regard to the two articles of the Constitution on the basis of which the CC proposed to declare the actions of the President unconstitutional. All this is also in the minutes. I simply said that neither of these two articles allow us to consider this issue, because article 121(6) does not provide for the participation of the CC in this procedure, while article 121(10) requires a special appeal of the Parliament for us to be able to consider this issue (there was no such an appear). Thus, from the legal point of view, we had no right to deal with this question. Naturally, no one even paid attention to my words. And the voting began almost immediately. There were two votings. It is obvious from the minutes that the results of the voting were falsified, because a majority was not reached. This session ended after midnight and as usual the journalists were waiting for us to come down and there was the usual hullabaloo. But everyone seemed to know the outcome in advance.
After the session ended Zorkin rushed to the White House (which at the time housed the Supreme Soviet of Russia). I heard him urging the other justices to join him so as to be there during the announcement of the verdict. With this proposal he even approached those who voted against it: to me, to Tamara Morshchakova, to Vitruk and Kononov. He said that was the only way to save our skins since KGB troops were already heading for the White House from where the suppression of the unlawful regime of President Yeltsin will begin. We, of course, refused to even go near it and went home.
The consequences of these events are well-known, and that is why I will not go into the details, but there is only one thing I would like to stress for fear that it might be overlooked by historians. It is the fate of those four Supreme Soviet deputies who tried to stop the President. Only several days or weeks following these events all four had been appointed to high positions in the President's Administration: Kovalyov became Chairman of the Human Rights Commission, Ryabov was appointed Chairman of the Central Election Commission, Stepashin headed the Federal Secret Service, and Pochinok was offered a high post in the Government where he began to deal with economic reform. I must say that for me such a turn of events and these new appointments where quite unexpected. Let us try to understand what happened. All four tried to stop the President, as well as Filatov and I. And I am sure that the President knew who wanted to get in touch with him and on what issue. And, nevertheless, all these four deputies were immediately granted very high positions. Probably the President was able to correctly assess their earnest intention to warn him of the dangerous course he was about to take, as well as their subsequent withdrawal from the Supreme Soviet and shift to the side of the President. That is why I believe that this is an interesting fact for future researchers which adds a few strokes to the profile of our President.
For me this story also had an unexpected continuation. A couple of day later, when I and three other justices announced our refusal to participate in the CC sessions since they had become of a distinct political nature, Zorkin's team began to search for ways and means of suspending our powers. Finally Justice Rudkin (at the time CC Deputy Chairman) who found out about my attempt to stop the President, proposed a very interesting wording of such a decision: "The powers of Ametistov as a CC Justice shall be suspended because of his hypocritical behavior." My hypocritical behavior was expressed, on the one hand, by my effort to stop the President and, on the other, by my voting against the general decision at the CC session.
Thus, as I already mentioned, immediately following the end of this CC session Mr.Zorkin dashed to the White House to meet his buddies Khasbulatov and Rutskoi. There, from a rostrum he solemnly read out announced the decision of the Constitutional Court according to which the actions of the President were unconstitutional and served as grounds for impeachment under two (!) articles of the Constitution. However, those in the White House had already removed the President from his position and had immediately appointed Mr.Rutskoi as Acting President and that is why he began to sign as "President Rutskoi". Thousands of copies of this CC decision were made which were distributed among the crowds surrounding the White House. This decision also triggered the subsequent events that had culminated in the tragedy of the 3rd and 4th of October. That is why the fault and the degree of participation of the CC in this story is quite extensive. Those who supported Zorkin had created with their own hands a legal basis for: first, the confrontation between the White House and the Kremlin and, second, the armed revolt. As I already mentioned, a number of savage and insane decisions were made at the White House most likely during that very night. One of these, for example, included capital punishment for the failure to observe the orders of the new government and the new president and for a violation of the constitutional order. Deputy Baburin was the "author" of this "outstanding" innovation although he, who considered himself a lawyer, better than others should have been aware of its utterly unconstitutional nature, since the Constitution prohibited the introduction of death penalty in all cases excluding premeditated murder. The next step was to present this decision for the consideration of the Constitutional Court. However, Zorkin did everything within his powers to avoid this, probably, counting that everything would soon be over and all scores would be settled on a supposedly legal ground.
September 23rd was the day of the first bloodshed. The White House bandits headed by Terekhov (the leader of a communist-fascist organization) attacked the HQ of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States formed after the disintegration of the Soviet Union). As a result of this attack two militia men were killed and it became clear that such a gangster den in the very center of the capital could no longer be tolerated, because it was simply becoming dangerous to society. That is when the attempt to isolate the White House had begun. It was first surrounded by the militia and then by barbed wire.
On October 24th, the CC Justices were summoned for a meeting. We had arrived. I do not remember exactly who, Zorkin or Luchin (a CC Justice) spoke about the CC taking certain measures directed toward establishing some kind of peaceful contacts between Khasbulatov and Rutskoi and the President. This is what I answered to this: "If until recently I did have ideas about any mediator functions with these people, after this night when innocent people have been killed, I see absolutely no possibility of contacting them and insist that this hotbed of danger and civil war should be stifled and neutralized by the use of all possible means". After the hysterical cries of several justices that "Yes, there was bloodshed and there will be more. The President who is a criminal must be punished!" everything became clear to me. After such declarations which were, incidentally, supported by Zorkin's other advocates, there was no point in my presence there. I was joined by Tamara Morshchakova, and later by Kononov and Vitruk and the four of us announced that "we refuse to take part in any meetings or sessions of the Constitutional Curt until they are of a political nature".
During this meeting I saw one of the justice's holding the October 24 issue of the Pravda newspaper. This issue contained an interview which said that Vitruk, Ametistov and others have been openly supporting the President since March and have been doing this, of course, on orders from CIA and other bad foreign espionage centers. The author had to doubts that the workshop devoted to constitutional courts and organized in Moscow in early September with the assistance of the Chicago School of Constitutional Justice (Law) and other organizations was a part of the same plot actively joined by Ametistov and his partners. As far as I understood this was the beginning of a legal foundation that was laid in order to take certain steps concerning me and my colleagues. I believe that if those events would have taken a different turn and I would still be alive, I would of course be accused as an "agent of imperialism" in the best traditions of our old times.
After that day we actually stopped taking part in the meetings and sessions of the Constitutional Court. Zorkin kept shuttling between the White House and the Constitutional Court advertising his so-call "zero option" which he had proposed as a compromise: "If President Yeltsin revokes his Decree # 1400, the White House will annul all its resolutions". He also added that "In that case the Constitutional Court would also revise its decisions". This was an absolutely wild idea, being a violent discrepancy of the law. In other words, if the verdict was passed and came into force, what were the grounds for its repeal? These were purely political games which had nothing to do with justice.
In response to our decision not to participate in the Constitutional Court's sessions, Zorkin and his advocates held, as they announced, three sessions in the course of one day. When they spoke about sessions they meant their meetings at which there was, of course, no quorum. They would talk for five minutes, call this a session and then do that again. This was an outright falsification. And after three such "sessions" they suspended our powers on the basis of a then existing law according to which a justice who had been absent during three sessions could be suspended. At the time a curious paper fell into my hands: the draft resolution suspending the authority of Justice Ametistov at the Constitutional Court. It was written by Mr.Rudkin who, proceeding from fact of my attempt to speak to the President on September 21, proposed the following wording: "Suspend the authority of Justice Ametistov for his double-dealing behavior which was expressed in the fact that he, on the one hand, tried to stop the President and to avoid the latter's unconstitutional actions and, on the other, voted for the decision of the Constitutional Court on the unconstitutional actions of the President". However, this absurd text was not accepted and our powers were suspended because of our failure to take part in three court sessions.
The situation around the White House continued to worsen. Several days later the White House was completely blocked, as it seed to us at that time. Crowds of supporters had gathered around the lines of militia and OMON, trying to force their way back and forth. At that time I was invited to take part in the meetings of a kind of a HQ headed by Mr.Krasavchenko (a President's aid) at which the most pressing issues connected with the existing critical situation were addressed. These meeting were also joined by Mr.Kovalyov, Mr.Livshits (who will soon become the President's aid on economics) and a number of other people. During these meetings we discussed all the questions connected with the blockade of the White House and the control over the traffic of people and arms. And there was control. But I got a phone call from Dasha Silvanskaya, a journalist who worked at the Polish radio and the daughter of the well-know journalist Marina Pavlova-Silvanskaya. Dasha told me that she knew for sure from her colleagues that they had no problems getting into the White House through underground service lines. Other people did that as well, and this way arms could be brought to the White House. I called Krasavchenko twice to inform him about this, but both times spoke to his assistant who assured me that my messaged had been related and that everything was fine. But as it turned out later things were not that fine, because these lines were used for brining in arms and new supporters of Khasbulatov and Rutskoi to the White House.
It was the end of September. I felt as restless, as everyone around me who were willing to do something in this troublesome situation. I called Shakhrai (President's aid) and said" :Sergei Mikhailovich, I have nothing to do right now and would be glad to by of any help. You can use me as an attorney or for writing documents." Several hours later he called and asked me to go to St.Petersburg and take part in a meeting of regional representatives. I agreed. He also said that justice Luchin was going there as a representative of the Constitutional Court. Next morning Shakhrai an I flew to St.Petersburg where we were met by Mayor Sobchak and quite a lot of people from the city administration. Interestingly, the famous comic actor Khazanov was there too and he seemed to be in friendly relations with Shakhrai. We were quickly driven to Kammeny Ostrov to a magnificent old mansion in which quite a lot of people had already gathered in the foyer. These were representatives of over 40 regions of the RF. The meeting was chaired by Sergei Belyayev, chairman of the St.Petersburg Executive Committee. Sobchak was very active in this meeting. Among other well-know figures present was Mr.Ilumzhinov (President of Kalmykia) and several deputies from the White House. As I could understand, the reason for this meeting was the fact that the representatives of the regions had sensed that their time had come and that there was a chance, while the central bodies of power where at each other's necks, to try to strengthen their own power and, perhaps, considering the current situation, to even head the country. And there was a good pretext: the country had to be saved. I wouldn't say that they were directly against the President. Their position was rather a neutral one and they were mostly concerned about improving the general situation.
Luchin arrived after me and was shocked when he saw me. He even refrained from making a presentation. At the end of the meeting he just said several words, after which I took the floor and put everything in place in regard to what was going on in the Constitutional Court including the story with our group, etc. I expressed my special opinion but the audience responded quite normally and there were no comments or objections. We returned to Moscow the same day.
Several days went by. The atmosphere was becoming more and more charged. Around October 2, I got the feeling that it was not safe for me to be present at the Constitutional Court. This was for a number of reasons and one of them was the changed security guards' attitude. One day, when Zorkin invited representatives of the Diplomatic Corps to the Court and was trying to tell them something about his "zero option", I tried to join this meeting but was stopped by Zorkin's guards who acted quite rudely. I began to feel that certain instructions had be given considering my presence at the Court. I decided to stay away for a few days.
On October 3, I was driving by Kalininsky Prospect and say that the traffic was blocked. I asked a militia man what was going on and he replied that demonstrators were moving toward the Mayor's Office. I knew that the red-brown (communist-fascist) crowd led by Ampilov (the leader of the extremist leftist organization Labor Russia that took part in the disorders) had been fuming near Smolenskaya Square for one or two days but I did not suspect that they would force their way to the Mayor's Office. My driver Yura took me to the middle of Kalininsky Prospekt where I got out of the car and started walking towards the Mayor's Office. When I crossed the Garden Ring I saw a crowd that was standing on the lever of the CMEA Building (the building of the former Committee for Mutual Economic Assistance of the former socialist countries which then housed Moscow's Government). Several thousand people formed a live wall facing the Mayor's Office, the former CMEA building, from which I could hear shouting and the sounds of shooting. At first I couldn't understand what was happening and asked someone from this crowd. A woman turned back and said: "Hurray! Hurray! We won! This is the end of Yeltsin! This is our revolution!". I could hardy realize what was going on and just stood there. Someone looked at me and shouted: "Hey! Ametistov is here! You're a dead man! You're a traitor! You're with the President! This is the end of you!" And stared encircling me. More and more people were turning towards me and shouting: "Ametistov! Ametistov! There he is!". I got a very weird feeling standing there amidst that crowd: it was a nice sunny day, a few minutes ago I was walking along Kalininsky Prospect where people were strolling and the restaurants were open and here I suddenly realize that this is the end of me. I decided that by no means should I start running. Firstly, because I was ashamed to be caught running away from them and, secondly, my instinct told me to act as with a dog: you should never run. I started to move back slowly using all my knowledge in dirty language. This seemed to discourage them. I was telling them that they had made a grave mistake and that tomorrow the authorities would be through with them. But they started shouting to me that I would be finished today. After than I turned my back upon them and started walking back along Kalininsky Prospekt. I was moving at the same pace as I had when I came there. I knew they were following me. They were not running or trying to catch up with me, they were just walking behind me. Someone threw a stone at my back. I put my had in my pocket, felt my pistol and thought: "What should I do? If worse comes to worse and anyone grabs me, I will start shooting". At this moment something crashed or exploded at the Mayor's Office and this saved me. My pursuers were distracted by this sound and left me alone. When I approached the Garden Ring I turned back and say that no one was following me. I came over to the car. My driver Yura asked me: "Why are you so pale?" I said I was fine. When I got into the car I realized that my shirt was wet through. That is how the events of that day started for me.
The Mayor's Office was being seized when I was there. After that the same crowd rushed to Ostankino to storm the national TV studios.
Some time later I got a phone call from my ex-wife Izabella, the mother of my daughter Olga. She said that at her job someone was circulating lists of those who should be executed and that I was on this list. This led me to the thought of ensuring the safety of my relatives. I remembered that a good friend of mine I had met in Poland during our meeting with Solidarnost, Agnezca Madzyak-Mishevska, a journalist who lived in Moscow, had offered her apartment as a shelter to her Moscow friends in case anything bad happed. I called her and she told us to come immediately. I sent a car to Usovo (a dacha district near Moscow) to bring my mother and my wife Olga to Moscow. On their return the three of us came to Agnezska. Afterwards I decided to go out to the city because I could not sit still in such a situation. I wanted to go to the Kremlin because something had to be going on there. The TV was describing the storming of Ostankino by the demonstrators, the shooting, the lack of guards and the absence of the militia. Finally, a sign appeared on the screen saying that the first national channel was not working because the rioters were in the studious. The situation was catastrophic. I was ready to go out but my mother and wife refused to let me out. They finally agreed under the condition that Olga would go with me. We started walking. It was dark and the streets were deserted. There was no militia except the usual militia men guarding foreign embassies. We walked from Bolshaya Gruzinskaya Street (where our friend's apartment was located) to Nikitskiye Vorota and tried to cross the boulevard. Two men dressed in black and carrying a machine-gun and a submachine-gun jumped out of the bushes and shouted: "Freeze! Show your ID!" We realized that these were not "our people" and rushed back to Malaya Gruzinskaya Street. We tried to cross the boulevard in two other places but everywhere were stopped by the same armed "men in black". Afterwards I learned that these were paramilitary troops from Pridnestrovye who were trying to seize the National News and Telegraph Agency, which they failed to do.
When we got back to the apartment, Egor Gaidar (one of the leaders of the democratic party Choice of Russia) was speaking on the TV. He called upon everyone to go to the Moscow City Council. After this I could no longer stay at home and Olga and I left the apartment for the second time. This time we went to Tverskaya Street where the situation was very different: there were a lot of three-color flags of Russia and I realized that these were "our people". We walked toward the City Council and saw several tens of thousands of people. Barricades were being erected. There was a line of young men around the City Council who did not let anyone in. I saw people I knew: the editor of Kuranty and Lev Ponomaryov who was giving orders. I started asking those whom I met on my way: "What is going to happen? There are a lot of people here but they are unarmed and if that armed gang from Ostankino gets here the barricades will not help." I was asked not to worry and told that if there the need arises, the people that are here will be armed. Much later I learned that Gaidar had prepared a thousand sub-machine guns. They would have been handed out to these men, most of whom were from the "live ring" that was formed around the White House during the 1991 coup.
After that we decided to go to the Kremlin, because before I left Filatov called me and said: "Please come here and help us". It was after midnight when we approached the Kremlin gates from the direction of the Manege. It was very quiet and there was no one except for the guards. We say machine gun men on the Kremlin wall. Then Sergei Parkhomenko, editor of the Today newspaper, came over to us and said that he had been everywhere - in the Kremlin and in Ostankino. Together we went through to the Kremlin. On the inside square we say the President's helicopter, one or two, I cannot recall the exact number. We also saw several buses from which armed men in full gear, probably paratroopers or special purpose units, were coming out and going into the building of the Palace of Congresses. Olga and I went to Filatov's office. There were a lot of people there: Poltoranin, Burbulis and Misha Fedotov. They were in a quite good mood. They told me that everything was fine and that Ostankino was freed from the rioters or, at least, protected from them. And that a decree on the state of emergency had to be prepared. And that is what I started doing together with Baturin. We worked on this decree the whole night and also listened to the radio and watched TV. Dozens of people spoke on TV about what was going on. Many of them behaved quite strangely, especially those like the well-known journalists Sasha Politkovsky and Alexander Liubimov who suggested that all Muscovites go to bed and see what happens in the morning. I liked the presentation of the actress Lia Akhedzhakova who said that no one should sleep because fascism was approaching and this meant death. I think that Gaidar spoke once again.
By early morning it became clear that Ostankino was not seized. It was decided to storm the White House and dislodge all those bastards from it. Around 7 a.m. Olga, I and the attorney Garry Reznick left the Kremlin. We walked through the deserted Red Square and by the Museum of History . We saw barricades on our way and young people were sitting around them and singing songs. A bright sun was rising above this peaceful scene. We took the metro and went to Agneshka's apartment where my mother and my cat were waiting for us. When we reached her apartment the storming of the White House had begun. The windows of our friend's apartment faced the White House from the opposite side from the embankment. We heard the shooting and saw clouds of smoke. At the same time the CNN broadcast of these events had begun. We spent the whole day watching TV screen and looking from the balcony at the White House. This is very difficult to describe but I had the impression that something terrible was happening. All this lasted the whole day with odd pauses when it seemed that the assault was subsiding when the tanks would approach and leave. But in the end at around 5 p.m. we saw crowds of people with raised hands coming out of the White House and that was the end. The next day we returned to our apartment on Krasnaya Presnya. These were my most vivid and grave recollections of those events.
On October 5, I went to the Constitutional Court. Neither Zorkin, nor his supporters were there. Some of them had took their families out of Usovo on the 4th of October. This was a splendid situation: on the 3rd of October I took my family away from Usovo and on the evening of the 4th, when it became obvious that the revolt was suppressed, Zorkin's followers were hurriedly leaving Usovo. They assumed that they would be persecuted the same as I and my family would have been persecuted had the events taken a different course. Thus was the intellectual and moral level of these people.
When a year-and-a-half after these events I was asked at one international conference: "What would you be risking if you had been taken in during those events?" I answered that I would have been risking my life or, as a minimum, my freedom. And what was Zorkin and company risking? Nothing. They did not even loose their positions in the Constitutional Court. Thus was the difference between two polar forces. Between the so-called Yeltsin's "rotten regime" which is being humiliated and slandered from all over and which vowed never to resort to Bolshevik methods and which rejects revolution. We are perfectly aware of the consequences of this decision. But this is a holy principles because Russia has exhausted its potential for sustaining violence: not a single drop of blood can be shed in this country. And there is the other side: the Ziuganov-Ampilov-Khasbulatov scum. Even the single fact of the issue of that decree on executions shows that they were preparing a so-called legal framework for big blood, for a pogrom not only in Moscow but in the entire country. And there are still many strange people whom I have always considered to be democrats and intellectuals and who are going out of their way to defame the image of the ruling power in the mass media so no one, God forbid, would suspect them in supporting the President. This is especially true in regard to journalists of the so-called democratic and independent press. What are they trying to prove? Don't they realize that the level of instability in our country is still so high that, unfortunately, the time of drawing distinctions between good and bad democrats has not yet come. And we remain faced by the same dilemma: the choice between the achieved level of rights and freedoms (no matter how meager it may be) which is the present regime which allows us to live and breathe or a regime that will bring death, blood, famine and war. That is our present dilemma. And I cannot understand why these people do not realize this. It is so simple. The October events have clearly shown us what to expect if that side wins.
But let us return to October 1993. A presidential decree suspending the activity of the Constitutional Court was issued on October 7th. However, according to this decree, the justices preserved their status. The justices were assigned to prepare a new draft law on the Court which would comply with the new Constitution. At the same time the agonizing process of removing Zorkin from power had begun. I was the first to bring up the question of Zorkin's resignation and I did this on my own without being prompted by anyone. I was sure that was the only right thing to do. Prolonged consultations and negotiations with Zorkin started the same day. Each justice spoke with him in private, some tried to convince him to hold out to the end, while others, like Oleinik and Rudkin tried to talk him into resignation. Sergei Filatov came to the Court the same day. We were sitting with him in Vitruk's office and he was telling us that someone had to explain to that character that either criminal action would be brought against him on the ground of, first, the falsification of the results of the voting he conducted on September 21, second, the illegal keeping of fire arms in the White House and, third, a misuse of funds, or he resigns. Frankly speaking, I disagreed with such a statement of this question. Once again this was a deal. Zorkin behaved most shamefully. He kept delaying his decision under the pretext of heart pain and a bad state of health. His wife and daughter and other relatives were running around him in circles. All this was an absolute disgrace. He behaved like a milksop and not like a man. Instead of leaving and slamming the door be kept clinging to his position with his hands and feet. Finally, the next day a resignation application was handed to him. But, unfortunately, it was impossible to get rid of him altogether: he was only removed from his position of chairman. Those who supported him also retained their positions. And I am sure that we will have a chance to observe the consequences.
Right after the October events Tamara Morshchyakova, Kononov and I proposed (and I mentioned this in many of my presentations) that all the CC justices resign. We insisted that it was our duty to do so. But I had no doubts that Zorkin and company would not support this proposal. But the most interesting thing was that the President did not support us as well. I spoke about this with Filatov and other people, but was told that would have been too much, that many steps had already been taken that brought about such grave consequences and that we would have to become reconciled and that the composition of the Constitutional Court would not change. I believe that this was a mistake because these people haven't learned their lesson and haven't forgotten anything. And if there is another crisis this will become obvious to everyone.
In mid-November I went to the United States and from there to Germany, spending a month-and-a-half abroad. I returned to Moscow at the end of December. And that was the end of the year of the "black October".
